Fordham Law Review
Volume 58

Issue 2

Article 2

1989

Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court
Deference to State Court Proceedings – A Response to Professor
Stravitz
Georgene M. Vairo

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court
Proceedings – A Response to Professor Stravitz, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 173 (1989).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State
Court Proceedings – A Response to Professor Stravitz
Cover Page Footnote
Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1972, Sweet Briar College;
M. Ed. 1975, University of Virginia; J.D. 1979, Fordham University School of Law. Section II of this
commentary is largely taken from on a report prepared by the Committee on Federal Courts, New York
State Bar Association, Report on the Abstention Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference
to State Court Proceedings (August 30, 1988), published in 122 F.R.D. 89 (1988). The drafting
subcommittee, of which this author was the chairperson and principle drafter, included Alan J. Russo,
Esq., Andrew P. Saulitis, Esq., and Daniel W. White, Esq. I gratefully acknowledge their contributions to the
Report. I also wish to thank Robert L. Haig, Esq., Chairperson of the Committee on Federal Courts for
allowing me to use the Report in this Commentary. Finally, I would like to thank Augustine B. Cheng,
Fordham Class of 1989, for his valuable assistance in preparing this Commentary.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2

MAKING YOUNGER CIVIL: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL COURT
DEFERENCE TO STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR STRAVITZ
GEORGENEM. VAIRO*

CONTENTS

Introduction ..............................................
I. The Abstention Doctrines .................................
A. Pullman Abstention ...................................
B. Burford Abstention ...................................
C. Younger Abstention ....
.........................
D. Colorado River Abstention ............................
II. A Case Study: Abstention in the Second Circuit ...........
A. DoctrinalDevelopments ...............................
B. The PracticalEffects of Abstention ....................
1. Civil Disputes of a Classwide or Institutional
N ature ...........................................
2. Federal Claims Brought During Criminal or
Disciplinary Proceedings ..........................
3. Federal Claims Brought to Gain a Tactical
Advantage in Pending State Court Proceedings ....
C. Conclusions and Recommendations ....................
III. Some Thoughts on Making Younger Civil ..................
A. Why ProfessorStravitz is Wrong ......................
B. What Does Federalism Really Mean? ..................
C. Rethinking Abstention Again ..........................
1. The Committee's Recommendations ...............

174
177
177
180
182
184
189
189
193
194
197
198
199
200
200
202
204
205

* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A.
1972, Sweet Briar College; M. Ed. 1975, University of Virginia; J.D. 1979, Fordham
University School of Law.
Section II of this commentary is largely taken from on a report prepared by the Committee on Federal Courts, New York State Bar Association, Report on the Abstention
Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings (August 30, 1988), published in 122 F.R.D. 89 (1988). The drafting subcommittee, of which
this author was the chairperson and principle drafter, included Alan J. Russo, Esq., Andrew P. Saulitis, Esq., and Daniel W. White, Esq. I gratefully acknowledge their contributions to the Report. I also wish to thank Robert L. Haig, Esq., Chairperson of the
Committee on Federal Courts for allowing me to use the Report in this Commentary.
Finally, I would like to thank Augustine B. Cheng, Fordham Class of 1989, for his
valuable assistance in preparing this Commentary.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

[Vol. 58

The Burden of Proof ..............................
The Choice of Law ...............................
The Presence of a Pending State Action ...........
The Merits of the Federal Issue ...................
The PennhurstProblem and
Institutional Litigation ............................
Conclusion ...............................................

206
208
209
210
210
211

INTRODUCTION

IN

an often quoted but largely ignored passage, Chief Justice John
LMarshall declared that the federal courts have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which
is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.",
Although this passage suggests that the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
mandatory, many exceptions to this basic proposition have evolved.'
Some observers believe that one class of exceptions-the judicially created abstention doctrines-prejudices plaintiffs' federal rights.' Some are
particularly concerned that the abstention doctrines threaten to deprive
plaintiffs, particularly indigent plaintiffs, of an effective forum for their
federal claims.4 In contrast, others believe that such concerns are unwarranted and that abstention is mandated by principles of federalism.5
More litigants than ever are trying to litigate their cases in federal
court.6 Courts have responded by raising the requirements for admission. For example, the Supreme Court has restrictively applied its test
for standing7 and has modified its test for determining when to imply a
1. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
2. The well established doctrine offorum non conveniens, for example, allows federal
courts to dismiss actions which, although brought under properly invoked federal jurisdiction, are filed in inconvenient forums. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
257-61 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947).
3. See, e.g., Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103, 1125-27 (1977); Redish, Abstention, Separationof Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 72-75
(1984); see also Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention
into Ongoing State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 49, 51-52 n.26 (1987) (collecting
articles).
4. A Subcommittee of the then Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State
Bar Association was formed to explore whether the perceptions and concerns raised by
the use of abstention were accurate. See infra Section II for the results of the study; see
also Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in
the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J. 665, 684-89 (1987) (Younger abstention routinely
results in denial of fundamental constitutional rights).
5. See, e.g., Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 Wm &
Mary L. Rev. 605, 626-27 (1981); Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
543, 580-85 (1985); Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 57 Fordham L. Rev. 997, 1032-33 (1989); Weinberg, The New Judicial
Federalism, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1191, 1225-26 (1977).
6. Filings in federal district courts have sharply risen over the last decade. For example, from 1979 to 1988, civil filings increased from 154,666 to 239,634, while between
1981 and 1988, appeals concomitantly increased from 26,362 to 37,524. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 1-13 (1988).
7. There has been a reassessment during the last twenty years on the focus of stand-
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private right of action.' The Court also has made it more difficult for
litigants who are properly admitted to remain in federal court9 and has
greatly expanded the abstention doctrines by which the federal courts
defer to state court proceedings.' This expansion may be seen as part of
the "currently trendy drive toward efficiency" at the expense of insuring
vindication of federal rights."
ing. Under the Warren Court, standing simply insured the requisite adversity to sharpen
the issues for proper judicial determination. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
The role of separation of powers, on the other hand, was to insure that the Court was
engaged in judicial, rather than political, business. The Burger/Rehnquist Court's conception of standing doctrine, in contrast, is "built on a single basic idea-the idea of
separation of powers." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
8. After 1975, the Supreme Court appeared to become more restrictive in implying a
private right of action under federal statutes. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1977) (no private right of action under section 14(e) of Securities and
Exchange Act). In 1979, the Court modified its test for implying a private right of action
when it elevated the factor of legislative intent to preeminent status over factors such as
whether the plaintiff was in the intended protected class and whether implying a private
right to sue would promote legislative goals. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 689-709 (1979). Accordingly, today the inquiry is essentially whether Congress
intended to create a private right of action. The Court's test has proven very difficult to
meet. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 520 (1988) (no private right of
action under Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (no private right of action
under Federal Water Pollution Control Act); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294
(1981) (no private right of action under section 10 of Rivers and Harbors Appropriations
Act of 1899); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1979) (no private
right of action under section 17(a) of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
In recent cases involving implied causes of action for damages under the Constitution,
the Court has carefully considered its power relative to Congress, and, not surprisingly,
has been more reluctant than in the past to imply causes of action under the Constitution.
The Court, citing the role of Congress, often has willingly found those "special factors
counseling hesitation" against a private right of action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). For example, in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), the Court found that Bivens did not authorize damages actions for enlisted men for alleged acts of discrimination because of the special
nature of military service and the availability of administrative relief. See id. at 304-05.
In a similar vein, in United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987), the Court, relying on
Chappell, held that a serviceman who voluntarily participated in an army study and was
secretly exposed to hallucinogenic drugs did not have a Bivens remedy because the injuries "[arose] out of or . . . in the course of activity incident to service." Id. at 3063
(quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky,
108 S. Ct. 2460, 2470-71 (1988) (refusing to imply damages remedy for plaintiffs who
were wrongfully deprived of federal benefits).
9. For example, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984), the plaintiffs alleged that conditions at a state mental hospital violated their federal constitutional and statutory rights, as well as their state statutory rights. The
Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment barred a federal court from exercising
jurisdiction over violations of state law by state officials. See id. at 106.
10. See infra Section II.
11. See Stempel, ,4 DistortedMirror: The Supreme Court'sShimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95, 193
(1988). Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent summary judgment trilogy-Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson I. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986);
and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)-is
designed to and will likely increase the possibility that cases will be disposed of before
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The Supreme Court considered related issues in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco
Inc.' 2 and held that a federal court may not enjoin state appellate procedures in a case in which a state trial court had entered a judgment for
billions of dollars.' 3 Recently, Professor Howard Stravitz has defended
the Pennzoil decision on "both theoretical and pragmatic grounds." 4
On an intuitive level, Texaco was not entitled to federal intervention in
its state court dispute with Pennzoil. 5 The ease and complacency with
which the Supreme Court extended the Younger abstention doctrine in a
civil context, however, is very disturbing. Indeed, Professor Stravitz's
uncritical acceptance of the majority's reasoning shows just how dangerous the increasingly malleable abstention doctrines have become. 6 The
Court pays lip service to Chief Justice Marshall's declaration, then proceeds to emasculate a plaintiff's right to choose a federal forum.
This Commentary responds to Professor Stravitz's argument in support of the extension of abstention announced in Pennzoil and suggests
how the use of abstention might be restrained.' 7 Section I will survey the
leading Supreme Court abstention cases in order to set forth the basic
principles and policies underlying the doctrines, to detail emerging
trial. See G. Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment and the Trilogy,printed in
Trial Evidence, Civil Practice and Effective Litigation Techniques in Federal and State
Courts 207 (1988). This, in turn, can be seen as part of the trend towards curbing the
perceived abuses of the federal system through the increased use of sanctions. See Vairo,
Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 190 (1988).
12. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
13. See id. at 10.
14. Stravitz, supra note 5, at 1000.
15. See Althouse, The Misguided Searchfor State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1051, 1090
(1988).
16. Professor Althouse has made the point that the Court has found it "easier and
easier" to abstain. See id. at 1078.
17. For samples of the never-ending debate about abstention, see, e.g., Bartels, Avoiding a Cdmity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating FederalCivil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 27 (1976); Calhoun, Exhaustion
Requirements in Younger-Type Actions: More Mud in Already Clouded Waters, 13 Ind.
L. Rev. 521 (1980); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103 (1977); Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1087 (1978); Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for
the Federalism Seesaw, 25 Loy. L. Rev. 659 (1979); Laycock, FederalInterference with
State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193; McMillan,
Abstention-The Judiciary'sSelf-Inflicted Wound, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 527 (1978); Redish, The
Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev.
463 (1978); Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in the Era of Younger v. Harris, 59
B.U.L. Rev. 597 (1979); Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: ReconstructingReconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141 (1977); Theis, Younger v. Harris! Federalism in Context,
33 Hastings L.J. 103 (1981); Wechsler, FederalCourts, State CriminalLaw and the First
Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 740 (1974); Weinberg, supra note 5, at 1191; Whitten,
Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The
Supreme Court and the Limits of JudicialDiscretion, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 591 (1975); Wilkinson, Anticipatory Vindication of Federal Constitutional Rights, 41 Alb. L. Rev. 459
(1977); Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal
Courts to Enforce ConstitutionalSajeguards in the State CriminalProcess, 125 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 266 (1976).
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trends and to identify practical problems. Section II reviews abstention
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the
results of the study on abstention by the Committee on Federal Courts of
the New York State Bar Association. Section III discusses Professor
Stravitz's thesis that Younger abstention deserves full civil application.
This section also explores how the disjointed abstention analysis should
be unified and modified to ensure that the doctrine is properly applied.
I.

THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES

There are four basic types of abstention: 8 Pullman, Burford, Colorado
River and Younger. Though different policies and purposes originally
supported the various forms of abstention, all four doctrines have the
same effect: deference by the federal courts to litigation in the state
courts.
A. Pullman Abstention
The Supreme Court established the first abstention doctrine in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co." Plaintiffs were black railroad employees who argued that a Railroad Commission order
discriminated against them in violation of the United States Constitution
and state statutes.20 The Supreme Court found that the state law was
uncertain and that a favorable ruling for the plaintiffs on state law might
obviate the need for the federal courts to decide the constitutional question.2 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the federal case should be
stayed so that the parties could obtain a definitive ruling on state law
from the state court.22 The Pullman doctrine is thus predicated on the
twin aims of avoiding premature constitutional adjudication and
federalism.2 3
One peculiar characteristic of Pullman abstention is that generally
there is no parallel pending state proceeding. Instead, the federal court
directs the plaintiff to begin an action in state court on the state law
claims. The plaintiff must choose either to litigate both the federal and
state claims in the state court, or to litigate only the state claims in state
18. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 81317 (1976). See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts §§ 52-52A, at 302-30 (4th ed.
1983) (describing various abstention doctrines). A fifth type of abstention is related to the
Burford doctrine, but acts independently and is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). See infra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
19. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In the paradigm Pullman case, a plaintiff alleges constitutional violations and pendent state claims, there is no parallel state proceeding, and the
court, in order to avoid constitutional adjudication, abstains to obtain a definitive ruling
by the state court on ambiguous state law issues.
20. See id. at 498.
21. See id. at 501.
22. See id. at 501-02.
23. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1973).
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court, with the right to return to the federal court on the constitutional
issue.2 4
Several requirements must be satisfied for a court to invoke Pullman
abstention. First, a federal court will abstain only if the disputed state
law is unclear.25 Some recent Supreme Court decisions suggest the need
for serious ambiguity in the state provision.2 6 For example, in Hawaii
HousingAuthority v. Midkiff,27 Justice O'Connor wrote: "[T]he relevant
inquiry is not whether there is a bare, though unlikely, possibility that
the state court might render adjudication of the federal question unnecessary. Rather.. . 'abstention is not to be ordered unless the statute is of
an uncertain nature, and is obviously susceptible [to] a limiting construction.' "28 On the other hand, in Pennzoil, Justice Blackmun, in concurrence, would have abstained under Pullman even though there was only
a mere possibility that the disputed state law would eliminate the need to
decide the federal issue 2 9 Thus, it remains unclear when state law is
sufficiently ambiguous to justify application of Pullman abstention.3 0
Second, the federal courts will consider whether the plaintiff has an
adequate state remedy. This requirement, arguably the most critical to
the Pullman doctrine, is grounded in the theoretical parity between the
federal and state courts.3 Although the exact meaning of an adequate
state remedy is unclear, the Supreme Court's current test presumes adequacy and makes it nearly impossible for a litigant to show inadequacy.
In Moore v. Sims,3" for example, the Court stated: "Abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional
24. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421
(1964). An unfortunate consequence of Pullman abstention may be that plaintiffs, in
order to prevent Pullman abstention, will forego state law claims when they file an action
in federal court. See Werhan, Pullman Abstention after Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial Federalism, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 449, 489 (1986).
25. See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84 (1975); Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970).
26. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987); Hawaii Housing
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1984).
Federal courts are generally reluctant to abstain in cases involving facial challenges
based on the first amendment. In Hill, for example, the Court held that abstention was
inappropriate where the statute was "'justifiably attacked on [its] face as abridging free
expression .'" Hill, 482 U.S. at 467 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 48990 (1965)). Not all of the Supreme Court justices, however, have accepted this proposition. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 476 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
28. Id. at 237 (quoting Zvickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967)).
29. See id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Althouse, supra note 15, at 1072.
30. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 1088 (1974).
31. Abstention is appropriate only if it is presumed that state courts are as competent
as federal courts to decide federal issues. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105, 1117 (1977).
32. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
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claims.""3 More recently, the Court in Pennzoil extended this presumption even further: "[W]hen a litigant has not attempted to present his
federal claims in related state court proceedings, a federal court should
assume that state procedures will afford an adequate
remedy, in the ab34
sence of unambiguous authority to the contrary."
The adequacy inquiry requires courts to determine whether a single
state proceeding is likely to resolve the dispute. Dombrowski v. Pfister,35
for example, involved a state statute that was challenged on first amendment grounds. Reasoning that only a series of lawsuits could clarify the
statute, the Court held that abstention was inappropriate because "those
affected by a statute are entitled to be free of the burdens of defending
prosecutions, however expeditious,
aimed at hammering out the struc36
ture of the statute piecemeal."
Pullman abstention raises several procedural issues. A federal court
invoking the doctrine will generally stay the proceeding.37 Some courts,
however, may order dismissal without prejudice to remove obstacles to
state court jurisdiction.3 ' This result demonstrates the irony of the Pullman doctrine. One justification for the doctrine is that federalism requires that state courts have the first opportunity to decide an unsettled
issue of state law. 39 In Harris County Commissioners v. Moore,4 however, the Court's decision to dismiss the federal claims to facilitate state
court disposition of state claims4 1 worked an anomalous result. After
disposition of the state claims, the plaintiff's attempt to reassert the preexisting federal claims in a new federal suit was foiled by the expiration
of the statute of limitations.4 2 The Pullman doctrine, in an attempt to
further the concerns of federalism, actually worked to frustrate those
aims by preventing exercise of the plaintiff's right to federal adjudication
of its constitutional claims.
In addition, even when the federal forum remains open, the cost and
delay attendant to abstention may deter the plaintiff's return to the federal forum.4 3 Finally, the Supreme Court has not determined what
preclusive effect a state court's fact finding will have when the case does
return to federal court. 44
33. Id. at 425-26.
34. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987).
35. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 491; see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964) (abstention
creates piecemeal adjudication and substantial undue delay).
37. See United States v. Michigan Nat'l Corp., 419 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (per curiam)
(listing cases).
38. See, e.g., Harris County Comm'rs v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975).
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. 420 U.S. 77 (1975).
41. See id. at 88-89.
42. See Moore v. El Paso County, 660 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. Unit A November
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982).
43. See Field, supra note 30, at 1087; Werhan, supra note 24, at 472.
44. Cf Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980) (issue preclusion from habeas
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Some commentators suggest that Pullman abstention has fallen into
disuse.4 5 Even if this is true, the doctrine is likety to assume greater importance in the wake of Pennzoil. The Court's opinion in Pennzoil seems
to merge the frequently invoked Younger v. Harris46 doctrine with the
principles which underlie Pullman abstention.4 7 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun's concurrence suggested that he would have explicitly invoked
4s
Pullman abstention rather than Younger in Pennzoil.
B.

Burford Abstention

Burford v. Sun Oil Co.49 involved a dispute over the apportionment of
oil drilling rights. The-plaintiff sought an injunction against a state order
which deprived it of certain drilling rights. No substantial issues of federal law were involved." The Texas legislature had provided that all
cases involving drilling rights were to be handled by one state court in
order to prevent inconsistent and confusing judgments.5 1 The Supreme
Court found that the federal court should defer to the state court because
intervention by the federal courts would interfere with that state policy.
Accordingly, the Court held that "a sound respect for the independence
of state action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand." 52
Burford abstention requires a federal court to dismiss a pending case
with prejudice. Because the typical Burford case5 3 involves no federal
issue, there is no need for the district court to retain jurisdiction. If any
federal issue arises, review may be sought in the Supreme Court. 4
For many years, federal courts rarely invoked Burford abstention because they seldom found that their intervention would impair sufficiently
important state interests. The Supreme Court has not expanded the
reach of Burford abstention. In its latest case exploring the doctrine, the
Court found that the mere existence of a complex state regulatory or
corpus action applicable to section 1983 claim); see also infra notes 110-1 15 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 15, at 1070 & n.105.
46. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For a discussion of the particularities of the Younger doctrine
of abstention, see infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
47. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11-12. The Court, however, was quick to point out that,
because appellants did not raise the issue, Pullman abstention was not explicitly being
invoked. See id. at 11 n.9; see also Althouse, supra note 15, at 1071.
48. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
50. Jurisdiction was based on diversity and federal question bases. See id. at 317.
The Court, however, found the constitutional question had long since been decided and
accordingly treated the case as one based on state law. See id. at 328-331.
51. See id. at 333-34.
52. Id. at 334.
53. In the paradigm Burford case, a federal plaintiff alleges a state law claim in which
important state regulatory issues are implicated. Since the state courts are a part of the
regulatory process, the federal court abstains out of considerations of comity and respect
for the paramount state interest.
54. Such review is circumscribed by the now fully discretionary nature of Supreme
Court jurisdiction. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
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administrative process did not require abstention."
The Burford doctrine, however, appears to have experienced a renaissance in recent years in the lower courts. For example, in Law Enforcement Insurance Co. v. Corcoran,5 6 the plaintiff asserted a claim against a
defunct insurance company which was under the control of a state-appointed rehabilitator. Finding that the state courts were "active partners" in the regulatory process, the federal court affirmed dismissal of the
complaint: "[T]he structure of the [state] system serves the state's strong
interest in centralizing claims against an insolvent insurer into a single
forum where they can be efficiently and consistently disposed of."57
While in both Burford and Corcoranthe federalism flag was raised, the
real problem was more practical: the nature of the disputes required adjudication by one voice. This is true because normally the issue in question requires the allocation of scarce resources, or at least presents a
situation in which one or more parties cannot comply with conflicting or
inconsistent state and federal court adjudications.5
In the typical Burford case, no federal question exists; instead, the federal court is asked to
resolve a matter of state law. Thus, the only interest which exists is a
federal litigant's preference for a federal forum. 59
The Court's approach to Burford abstention in N. O.P.S.I v. Councilof
New Orleans6° partially confirms this point. The plaintiff in N.O.P.S.I
did not state claims under state law alone. Rather, the primary claim
involved federal preemption.6 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
found that the mere presence of complex state administrative processes
or a potential for conflict with state law did not justify Burford abstention.62 Justice Scalia concluded that abstention was improper because
"no inquiry beyond the four corner's of the [state's] retail rate order is
needed to determine whether it is facially preempted ....
Such an in55. See N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2514 (1989).
56. 807 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987).
57. Id. at 44; see also Roy v. Verchereau, 619 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (D. Vt. 1985)
(Burford abstention appropriate in labor disagreement action even though federal claims
were made); Price v. Rust, 527 F. Supp. 569, 575-76 (D. Conn. 1981) (abstention proper
when landowner can present claims in state proceeding). On the other hand, in Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), the court found that
the plaintiff's challenge the creation of a state agency whose purpose was to take over the
plaintiff-a highly regulated business--did not threaten the uniform application of state
law and accordingly was not an appropriate case for Burford abstention. See id. at 400.
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
59. Justice Scalia's opinion in N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506
(1989), provides an example. Writing for the Court, he found that Burford abstention
was inappropriate because no state law claim was involved. Rather, the plaintiff's claim
was based on judicial preemption of state rate making in the energy industry. See id. at
2513-15.
60. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
61. See id. at 2514-15. The plaintiff, a utility company, sought reimbursement for the
cost of building a nuclear power plant. A federal agency had previously found the plaintiff's participation in the project to be reasonable. The plaintiff argued that the state's
refusal to permit full reimbursement violated federal law.
62. See id.
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quiry would not unduly intrude into the processes of state government or
undermine the state's ability to maintain desired uniformity."63 Ironically, this language suggests that Burford abstention may be appropriate
when there is a need for the federal court to look behind a state order
which allegedly violates federal law, thus planting the seed for the doctrine's further growth in the future.
A related abstention doctrine was enunciated in Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux.' In Thibodaux, the Supreme Court held
that abstention was proper in a diversity action concerning the scope of
the municipal eminent domain power under state law. As in Burford, the
Court was concerned with "the maintenance of harmonious federal-state
relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State." 6
Thibodaux abstention applies "where there have been presented difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar."66
The doctrine has been extended beyond the area of eminent domain.6 7
C.

Younger Abstention

The Anti-Injunction Act6 8 prohibits a federal court from enjoining
most pending state proceedings. Three statutory exceptions exist, the
most pertinent being when Congress expressly permits an injunction.6 9
In Mitchum v. Foster,7" the Supreme Court held that Congress intended
section 1983 actions to be exempt from the Anti-Injunction Act.7 1 Thus,
the federal courts have the constitutional and statutory power to enjoin
state criminal or civil proceedings.
In Younger v. Harris,72 however, the Supreme Court held that,
notwithstanding their statutory and constitutional authority, federal
63. Id. at 2515.
64. 360 U.S. 25 (1959). In the paradigm Thibodaux case, a plaintiff alleges unclear
state law claims of substantial public import and the federal court abstains out of considerations of comity and respect for the paramount state interest.
65. Id. at 29.
66. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976). Abstention is not appropriate when factors which counsel for deference under
the Thibodaux standard are missing. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187-89 (1959) (abstention inappropriate where state eminent domain
law settled); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943) (abstention inappropriate when no state court interference and no public policy or interest is served).
67. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968) (water
rights construed under state law).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
69. The Anti-Injunction Act provides: "A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by an
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." Id.
70. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
71. See id. at 242-43.
72. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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courts ordinarily should not enjoin state criminal proceedings.7 3 Rather,
absent a showing of prosecutorial bad faith or harassment, a federal
court cannot enjoin a pending state prosecution simply because the statute on which the prosecution is based is unconstitutional.7 4
Younger abstention serves several policies.75 First, courts of equity
should abstain when an adequate remedy at law exists and where the
party will not suffer irreparable harm. Second, the doctrine prevents
multiple suits where a single action adequately protects the asserted
rights. Third, the doctrine promotes the vital consideration of comity: "a
proper respect for state functions" or "Our Federalism ' 76 require that
federal courts refuse to intervene in state proceedings.
Three critical requirements for invoking Younger are that there be a
pending state proceeding, that important state interests be at stake and
that there be an adequate state forum. 7 7 As is the case in Pullman abstention, however, the adequacy requirement is easily met.78 Similarly,
the degree of state interest required to justify abstention is minimal.79
Thus, the only differences between the two doctrines seem to be the procedural posture of the case at the state level when the federal court considers whether to abstain and, in the paradigm case, the immediate
remedy sought by the Younger plaintiff.
73. In the paradigm Younger case, there is a pending state criminal proceeding and
the state defendant brings a federal action under section 1983 alleging that the state criminal statute is unconstitutional. When the plaintiff has a full and fair opportunity to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute in the state proceeding and seeks equitable
relief restraining that proceeding, the federal court will abstain out of principles of comity
and federalism.
74. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 48-49. Younger abstention is equally inapplicable if the
disputed statute is "'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional protection
in every clause, sentence and paragraph . . .""Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck,

313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
75. According to Professor Redish, there are four theoretical foundations for application of the Younger doctrine:
(1) The desire to avoid affronting state judges by questioning their competence
and/or willingness to enforce constitutional rights; (2) the need to prevent federal judicial interference with the accomplishment of state substantive legislative goals; (3) the need to preserve the discretion of state executive officers in
general and state prosecutors in particular; and (4) the desire to prevent federal
interference with the orderly operation of the state judicial process.
M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 298

(1980).

76. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
77. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
627 & n.2 (1986).
78. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Indeed, one commentator suggests
that the Supreme Court's requirement in Pennzoil that there be "unambiguous authority
to the contrary," Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987), to overcome the
presumption of adequacy amounts to a "requirement that state remedies be exhausted."
Althouse, supra note 15, at 1065.
79. See Althouse, supra note 15, at 1053-54. Professor Stravitz recognizes this point
in his discussion of the civil cases leading up to, and including, Pennzoil. See Stravitz,
supra note 5, at 1000-08.
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The Supreme Court has extended Younger dramatically to bar injunctions of civil proceedings which implicate important state interests when
adequate relief is available in the state court.8" In addition, Younger has
been applied to declaratory and other forms of relief.81 Furthermore, a
court should not necessarily dismiss after abstaining under Younger.
Rather, the federal court may stay the proceeding when the plaintiff alleges claims for monetary
relief that cannot be redressed in the state
82
court proceeding.
Younger abstention is troubling because it is extremely malleable. For
example, the recent extension of Younger in Pennzoil to purely private
civil actions shows that the test for avoiding Younger abstention will be
difficult for any federal litigant to meet. While the circumstances in
Pennzoil may have been sui generis and the Court in its latest Younger
case-N.O.P.S., v. Council of New Orleans-8 3 declined to require abstention in a civil context,8" the doctrine nonetheless has been routinely
applied to a host of federal claims."'
D.

Colorado River Abstention

The final type of abstention serves quite different-and somewhat less
lofty-purposes than the first three. Colorado River abstention "rest[s]
on considerations of [w]ise judicial administration." 86 Not surprisingly,
the doctrine had its origins in the busy nature of the lower federal courts:
80. See, e.g., Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 1 (federal court may not enjoin state supersedeas
bond provision to protect the functioning of the state judicial system); Dayton, 477 U.S.
at 619 (Younger abstention appropriate pending outcome of state civil rights commission
proceeding); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982) (abstention appropriate in attorney disciplinary proceeding); Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415 (1979) (abstention appropriate in parental rights proceeding); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (Younger appropriate in proceeding to determine welfare
fraud); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (abstention appropriate in civil contempt
proceeding); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (abstention appropriate in
civil nuisance proceeding).
81. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971); see also Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 84-85 (1971) (Younger applies to criminal suppression proceeding).
82. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S.Ct. 523, 530 (1988).
83. 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2515-20 (1989).
84. See id. at 2517-18.
85. See, e.g., Allen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Younger abstention ordered as to equitable claims, but not to damages action); Marcal
Paper Mills, Inc. v. Ewing, 790 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1986) (Younger appropriate pending
appeal in state court of legal issue raised in unrelated federal action); see also notes 142155 and accompanying text. But see Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837
(1st Cir. 1988) (defendant may waive Younger abstention); Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d
338 (3d Cir.) (Younger applicable only when state proceedings initiated by state agency or
official), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 965 (1985); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, 652 F. Supp. 515 (E.D.N.Y.) (in action seeking improvement of state mental
facilities, bifurcation of federal and state claims more appropriate than abstention), rev'd
on other grounds, 832 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1987).
86. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952)).
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when parallel federal and state cases proceed concurrently, the federal
action is dismissed in order to conserve judicial resources and to clear
dockets.87
ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrict v. United States8 8 involved
a disagreement over water rights. The United States, while a defendant
in parallel state actions concerning water rights, brought an action in
federal court involving the same rights. The Supreme Court held that
none of the other abstention doctrines applied. Because the federal
courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation" 89 to exercise the jurisdic-

tion given them, the Court concluded that "[in] the absence of weightier
considerations of constitutional adjudication and state-federal relations,"
dismissal of a concurrent federal action is appropriate only in rare and
"exceptional" circumstances. 90
The Court then listed the factors that lower courts should consider in
deciding whether to abstain because of exceptional circumstances:
whether the state court already had jurisdiction over the disputed res;
whether the federal forum was inconvenient; whether the federal action
encouraged piecemeal litigation; and whether the state or federal court

first obtained jurisdiction. 91

Applying these factors, the Court held that a federal statute which
permitted suit against the United States in water rights disputes evidenced a federal policy disfavoring piecemeal litigation. 92 Other factors
also pointed to abstention. 93 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that
the district court properly dismissed the federal action.
Moses H. Cone MemorialHospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,94 decided seven years after Colorado River, provided further indications of
the Court's views on this type of abstention. 95 Moses H. Cone involved a
87. See Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949). In the paradigm
Colorado River abstention case, there is a pending state proceeding and a corresponding
federal case involving the same or functionally similar claims and parties, no constitutional or federalism problems are presented, and the federal court abstains out of considerations of wise judicial administration.
88. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
89. Id. at 817.
90. See id. at 818.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 819.
93. These include the absence of a pending federal action when the motion to dismiss
was filed; the magnitude of the suit; the inconvenience of the federal forum and the previous United States participation in prior water rights proceedings. See id. at 820.
94. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
95. Prior to Moses H. Cone, the Court upheld the application of Colorado River abstention in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), a securities case in
which there was a pending state action that involved the same factual questions even
though the federal plaintiff, who was the defendant in the state court action, could not
raise the securities claims in the state court. The value of Calvert as a precedent is limited, however, for two reasons. First, the case turned on the rather technical question of
whether the rigorous test for granting mandamus was met. See id. at 661-62. In addition,
the Court's decision commanded only a plurality of the justices. Justice Blackmun, upon
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construction dispute in which a hospital sued its contractor seeking a
declaratory judgment that the construction company's claims for delay
costs were meritless.9 6 The state court granted an ex parte temporary
restraining order, which prevented the contractor from seeking an order
compelling arbitration. Thereafter, the construction company filed a federal action seeking an order to compel arbitration. 97 The district court
granted the defendant's motion to stay the federal action pending the
outcome of the state action.9" The court of appeals reversed and ordered
the district court to enter an order compelling arbitration.9 9 The
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Moses H. Cone Court added two more factors to the Colorado
River abstention test: whether federal or state law controls the issue in
dispute" and whether the state proceeding will adequately protect the
rights of the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction."' Analyzing
the Colorado River abstention factors, the Court found that the Federal
Arbitration Act"°2 indicated Congressional intent to permit piecemeal litigation if necessary to secure the enforcement of arbitration agreements;
that it was irrelevant that the state action had advanced further; and
finally, that the state court action might not adequately protect the construction company's federal rights.103 Therefore, the Court concluded
that abstention would be unwarranted." °
Moses H. Cone warned that the decision to abstain under Colorado
River's "exceptional circumstances" test "does not rest on a mechanical
checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction." 10 5 Despite this caveat, lower federal courts
have readily found the exceptional circumstances necessary to justify abstention.10 6 In fact, an overcrowded docket alone may be enough to inwhom the plurality depended for its decision, clearly distinguished himself from the
Court's rationale. See id. at 667-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
96. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7.
97. See id.

98.
99.
100.
101.

See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 8.
id. at 23-26.
id. at 26.

102. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
103. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-26
(1983).

104. See id. at 19.
105. Id. at 16.

106. See, e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 806
F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1986) (ColoradoRiver appropriate to prevent inconsistent judg-

ments and to facilitate apportionment of insurance defense costs); Fuller Co. v. Ramon

Gill, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 310 (1st Cir. 1986) (Colorado River appropriate because state

court competent to decide issues); Lumen Constr., Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., 780 F.2d
691, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (ColoradoRiver invoked to defer to earlier state interpleader
action, even though additional parties existed in the federal action); Vega Arriaga v. J.C.
Penney, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 117, 122 (D.P.R. 1987) (ColoradoRiver appropriate to prevent
piecemeal litigation); DeVona v. City of Providence, 652 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D.R.I. 1987)
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voke Colorado River abstention.
More importantly, the Court has applied the doctrine and ordered abstention in cases involving federal claims. In Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe,"°7 the Court held that federal suits brought by Indian
tribes to adjudicate water rights disputes are subject to dismissal under
Colorado River abstention.108 Thus, Arizona suggests that Colorado
River abstention may be appropriate even where state courts will be adjudicating federal claims. 10 9
Colorado River abstention often presents the problem of res judicata
and exclusive federal jurisdiction. In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance
Co.,"o the Court refused to grant mandamus in a securities case in which
the district court invoked ColoradoRiver abstention. 1 ' When a federal
plaintiff loses a state court breach of contract action, as happened in Calvert, the question exists whether the state court judgment will preclude
litigation of a federal securities claim. In support of preclusion, it can be
argued that a state defendant must raise related claims as compulsory
counterclaims in the first proceeding and that res judicata or collateral
estoppel bar any subsequent action. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated that a judgment by either a federal or state court would ordinarily
be res judicata in the other." 2 The implicit conclusion from Calvert,
(Colorado River appropriate notwithstanding existence of federal question jurisdiction
when state proceeding more comprehensive); Schomber v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210,
218 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Colorado River proper in class action in deference to state court
which already consolidated cases); Classen v. Weller, 516 F. Supp. 1243, 1244-45 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (ColoradoRiver stay proper in antitrust action). But see Andrea Theatres, Inc.
v. Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1986) (ColoradoRiver inappropriate in antitrust action because "abstention would run counter to Congress' determination
...that federal courts should be the primary fora for handling such claims" and because
state court decision would not receive preclusive effect in federal court); Silberkleit v.
Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1983) (same in securities and ERISA
context).

107. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
108. See id. at 569-70.
109. At first blush, Arizona seems to be inconsistent with Moses H. Cone, which focused on the "presence of federal-law issues [as the] major consideration weighing against
surrender." Arizona, 463 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1983)). Arizona,
however, may be unique as it involves a federal statute, the McCarran Amendment, 43
U.S.C. § 666 (1982), that militates against piecemeal litigation. In this instance, the
Moses H. Cone federal law factor is outweighed by the congressional command which
"encourages state courts to undertake the task of quantifying Indian water rights." Arizona, 463 U.S. at 569.

110. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
111. See id.at 665.
112. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 567 (1983); see also Migra
v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1984) (section 1983 does
not override state preclusion law and guarantee petitioner fully litigated judgment in both
federal and state forums); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982)
(section 1738 requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to state administrative
agency determinations); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980) (state court judgments may be given preclusive effect in subsequentsection 1983 actions).
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however, argues against this result because the defendant in such a case
cannot raise exclusively federal claims-such as securities claims-in the
state court action.
Years later, in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons," 3 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who litigated and lost
state unfair competition claims in state court may be precluded from
bringing their related exclusively federal claims in a subsequent federal
action." 4 From this precedent, it can be argued that the state defendant/federal plaintiff in a Calvert-type situation may also be precluded.
On the other hand, the state defendant/federal plaintiff in Calvert, because of the inability to choose the forum, is in a worse position than the
plaintiffs in Marrese. In Calvert, the state defendant/federal plaintiff was
brought into the state court, while the Marrese plaintiffs initiated both
the state and federal actions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that preclusion probably would not apply under these
circumstances. "'
Another procedural problem dogs application of Colorado River abstention. Courts have frequently discussed whether the federal courts,
when invoking ColoradoRiver abstention, should stay or dismiss the federal action.' 16 Although the Colorado River Court affirmed the district
court's dismissal 17 and the Moses H. Cone court equated a stay with a
dismissal, ' 8 stay orders are generally less disastrous for plaintiffs because
of potential problems with statute of limitations. Accordingly, most
courts will grant a stay rather than a dismissal." 9 For example, in Board
of Education of Valley View School District v. Bosworth,'I2 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invoked Colorado River abstention in an
action by a school board alleging due process violations for failure to
distribute tax revenues to local entities. The Court found, however, that
121
the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed the action.
The Supreme Court has become quite adept at guarding the federal
113. 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
114. See id. at 384-86.
115. See Andrea Theatres, Inc. v. Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.
1986).
116. See, e.g., LaDuke v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1561-62 (7th
Cir. 1989) (stay rather than dismissal is appropriate under Colorado River); Rosser v.
Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Ingersoll-Rand Financial
Corp. v. Callison, 844 F.2d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 1988) (when state proceeding not strictly
parallel to federal proceeding, Colorado River requires stay as opposed to dismissal).
117. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 806
(1976).
118. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28
(1983). The Moses H. Cone Court, while equating the effects of a stay with dismissal,
expressly reserved decision as to which procedure is correct when Colorado River is applied. See id. at 28; see also Arizona v..San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 570 n.21
(1978) (issue whether to stay or to dismiss without prejudice unanswered).
119. See, e.g., supra note 116 and cases cited therein.
120. 713 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1983).
121. See id. 1321-22.
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courthouse door. Lower courts, acknowledging the Court's signal, have
vigorously applied the abstention doctrines. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit provides a perfect example of a lower court's enthusiastic application of abstention doctrines.

II. A

CASE STUDY: ABSTENTION IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT

The purpose of the Committee on Federal Courts Report 122 was to
explore whether the abstention doctrines have led to loss of federal rights
or undue delay. The Committee's study provided information to track
the consequences of the various abstention doctrines since 1971, the year
in which the Supreme Court decided its landmark abstention case,
23
Younger v. Harris.1

A. DoctrinalDevelopments
The Second Circuit has always been a strong proponent of abstention.
Indeed, what has come to be known as ColoradoRiver abstention had its
antecedents in a doctrine developed much earlier in the Second Circuit.
In Mottolese v. Kaufman,'2 4 shareholders brought a derivative action on
behalf of a New York corporation against its directors and a number of
corporations. At the time the plaintiffs brought the suit, however, there
was a pending state action involving substantially the same issues and
same defendants. As a result, the district court judge stayed the federal
proceeding. The Second Circuit, noting that "equity has always interfered to prevent multiplicity of suits,'
26
mandamus.

1 25

denied the petition for

The Second Circuit has routinely applied ColoradoRiver abstention to
conserve scarce judicial resources in cases where there was a parallel
state court proceeding. 27 In Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual
122. To obtain data about the practical impact of abstention, a questionnaire was developed. See Appendix A. The questionnaires were mailed to plaintiffs' attorneys in reported cases in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
ordered abstention since 1971. Follow-up interviews were conducted with many of the
attorneys.
Because the Committee was concerned chiefly with the types of abstention that may
lead to loss of federal claims, the Report focused on cases in which federal claims were
asserted. It was not possible to locate attorneys for all the plaintiffs. Thirty-nine questionnaires were mailed out, and responses were received with respect to about half the
cases. Publicly available information was researched to supplement the information received from the attorneys. While this study cannot in any sense be described as scientific,
the cases for which information was obtained appear to represent a reasonable crosssection of the range of abstention cases and issues. Accordingly, the Committee believed
that certain conclusions could validly be drawn and recommendations made from what
was learned.
123. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
124. 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
125. Id. at 303.
126. See id. at 304.
127. See, e.g., General Reinsurance Corp. v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 853 F.2d 78, 81-82
(2d Cir. 1988) (ColoradoRiver appropriate when deference to state proceeding to deter-
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Insurance Co. v. City of New York, 128 for example, an insurance company
brought a subrogation action in federal court against various New York
entities for damages arising from a 1983 power blackout. After the federal action was filed, similar actions were instituted in New York state
courts. Applying the exceptional-circumstances test announced in Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, the Second Circuit upheld the district
court's decision to abstain. 2 9 The court noted that there were no federal
law issues involved that weighed against surrender.1 30 In addition, consolidation of cases in state court would avoid piecemeal litigation and
would lead to more efficient adjudication of the issues, which exclusively
involved questions of local law.1"'
Pullman is also widely applied in the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit routinely applies Pullman abstention in section 1983 actions, leaving
the state courts to decide such cases on state law grounds.' 3 2 In addition,
the court invokes
Pullman in cases where a pending state court proceed133
ing exists.
The application of Pullman has also erected barriers for class action
plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate their claims in federal court. In Pineman

v. Oechslin,134 plaintiffs brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of Connecticut's revised State Employees Retirement Act.
The Second Circuit abstained, holding that the state court should have
mine rights under excess insurance policy avoids piecemeal litigation); American Disposal Servs., Inc. v. O'Brien, 839 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988) (Colorado River appropriate
when federal civil rights complaint is being adjudicated in pending state proceeding);
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411, 414-15
(2d Cir. 1986) (ColoradoRiver necessary in adjudication of state insurance claims in order to avoid inconsistent judgments); Telesco v. Telesco Fuel & Masons' Materials, Inc.,
765 F.2d 356, 363 (2d Cir. 1985) (ColoradoRiver appropriate where state court had exercised jurisdiction for substantial length of time and case involved novel theory of state
law); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 205, 210-211
(2d Cir. 1985) (exceptional circumstances existed where parallel actions would force numerous plaintiffs to defend complex litigation on two fronts); Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d
960, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1980) (Colorado River appropriate in ERISA claim where pending
state proceeding existed and Congressional intent is to relegate insurance matters to the
states).
128. 762 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1985).
129. See id. at 212.
130. See id. at 211.
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Catlin v. Ambach, 820 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pullmanappropriate when dispute concerns a dispositive interpretation of New York residency statute for
children); West v. Village of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1984) (Pullman
appropriate where parties can efficiently obtain a state court interpretation on state law
that moots federal claim).
133. See, e.g., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 69 (2d Cir. 1978) (Pullman appropriate
where a state court proceeding could decide whether New York's medicaid statute covered religious nursing homes); Shelton v. Smith, 547 F.2d 768, 770 (2d Cir. 1976) (Pullman appropriate when pending state court proceeding concerning parental visitation
rights exists).
134. 637 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 72 (1988).
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the opportunity to address the state law issue of the suit.'
State courts,
however, are generally hostile to class actions.136 Abstention in such situations generally exacerbates the already complex problems plaintiffs
have in bringing class action suits.
The Second Circuit has injected new life into Burford abstention, particularly in the area of state regulation of insurance. 1 7 In addition, the
court has adopted a broad view of the doctrine, extending Burford abstention far beyond its strict doctrinal basis. For example, the Second
Circuit has applied Burford abstention in the absence of complex issues
of state law.'13 In addition, the circuit has been willing to apply Burford
when federal interests are implicated. In New York State Associationfor
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,13 9 for example, the court abstained on
Burford grounds in order to avoid conflict with New York's administration of its Medicaid system even though federal funding of Medicare implicates substantial federal interests. 4°
The Second Circuit routinely applies the principles of abstention announced in Younger v. Harris141 when state court criminal proceedings
are involved. 142 In addition, the Second Circuit has extended abstention
to dismiss federal actions bearing upon non-criminal proceedings, including those in which civil rights claims are raised under section 1983.143
135. See id. at 605-06.
136. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Andra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 34-37 (2d Cir. 1988) (Burford
abstention proper where Superintendent of Insurance attempted to recover proceeds allegedly due under reinsurance agreements); Law Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807
F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1986) (Burford abstention proper where insurer brought declaratory judgment action against Superintendent of Insurance), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017
(1987); Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 963-65 (2d Cir. 1980) (Burford abstention proper
where plaintiff brought suit against Superintendent of Insurance who, as liquidator, had
terminated retirement benefits).
138. Levy, 635 F.2d at 964.
139. 727 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1984).
140. See id. at 245; see also Grossman v. Axelrod, 466 F. Supp. 770, 779 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (abstention appropriate when unclear state law regarding Medicaid system is matter of substantial state concern), aff'd, 646 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1981).
141. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
142. See, e.g., Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 76-78 (2d Cir. 1988) (abstention appropriate when criminal defendant attempts to avoid prosecution by challenging constitutionality of peremptory jury challenges).
143. See, e.g., Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (2d Cir. 1977) (indicating
the Second Circuit's view that it was not yet decided if Younger should apply to pending
administrative hearing); McCune v Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1975) (Younger
abstention appropriate after administrative proceedings concerning personal appearance
of officer); McDonald v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Div., 565 F. Supp. 37, 39-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Younger applied to bar a federal action where administrative charges
were filed, but not yet heard); Schachter v. Whalen, 445 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Younger abstention was proper where there was an ongoing administrative investigation
of physician who allegedly had been improperly prescribing drugs), aff'd on other
grounds, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978); Youth Int'l Party v. McGuire, 572 F. Supp. 1159,
1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (abstention appropriate when opportunity to raise constitutional
claims in administrative proceedings exists); Lang v. Berger, 427 F. Supp. 204, 214-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (abstention appropriate during administrative proceeding to determine
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The net effect is a judicial limitation of the federal forum for civil rights
plaintiffs with actionable section 1983 claims. This creates a tension between the statute expressly affording a federal forum and the judiciallycrafted policies expressed in the various abstention doctrines.
Two recent Second Circuit cases illustrate this tension. First, Christ
the King Regional High School v. Culvert " involved a claim that the
New York State Labor Relations Board's ("SLRB") exercise of jurisdiction over a church-affiliated high school violated the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the United States Constitution. 4 5 The district
court dismissed the school's complaint on preemption grounds. 146 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 47 In so doing, the
Second Circuit, relying on Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 148 applied the Younger principles of federalism and comity
to the state administrative proceedings. In deciding whether abstention
was appropriate in Culvert, the Second Circuit considered whether there
was an ongoing state proceeding, so found in the SLRB proceeding;
whether an important state interest was involved, so found in the State's
"compelling interest in regulating the duty to bargain collectively;" and
whether the federal plaintiff had an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his constitutional claims during or after the state proceeding, so
found in the availability of New York's C.P.L.R. article 178
proceeding
49
against state officials subsequent to the SLRB proceeding.
Culvert demonstrates the ease with which a federal court can now relegate a plaintiff to state court by declining to hear a case properly before
it. The Culvert test is very flexible: many forms of "state action" may be
characterized as an "ongoing state proceeding"; virtually any state interest can be described as "important;" ' 150 and reliance on the mere existence of Article 78 or similar review procedures presumes, prospectively,
physician's fitness to partake in Medicaid reimbursement programs); Streter v. Hynes,
419 F. Supp. 546, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Younger bars scetion 1983 action where special
prosecutor appointed to investigate nursing homes subpoenaed records);
144. 815 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987).
145. See id. at 221.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 222.
148. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
149. See Christ the King Regional High School v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987).
150. See, eg., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1987) (state has important interest in enforcing private judgment). As Justice Stevens explained in his
concurrence,
By abandoning the... requir[ement] that the State have a substantive interest in
the ongoing proceeding, an interest that goes beyond its interest as adjudicator
of wholly private disputes.., the Court cuts the Younger doctrine adrift from
its original doctrinal moorings which dealt with the States' interest in enforcing
their criminal laws ....
Id. at 30 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia's references in N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506
(1989), to "generic proceedings," id. at 2516, is perhaps an attempt to put Younger back
on the moorings.
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the ability of state courts to provide adequate remedies for violations of
federal law. Furthermore, the mere existence of such review is cold comfort to a plaintiff challenging present state interference with federal constitutional rights.
The Second Circuit reached a similar result in University Club v. City
of New York.'
There, private clubs brought section 1983 claims alleging that public accommodation anti-discrimination legislation was being
applied unconstitutionally to deprive the clubs of their constitutional
rights to freedom of association, privacy, due process and equal protection. The Second Circuit, as it did in Culvert, held that the district court
should have abstained under the Dayton ChristianSchools test.1 52 The
court found that the enforcement proceeding by the New York City
Commission on Human Rights constituted an ongoing state proceeding,
that elimination of prohibited sex discrimination was an important state
interest and that an article 78 proceeding provided
an adequate opportu15 3
nity for judicial review of constitutional claims.
After Culvert and University Club, it is clear that Younger abstention
may override the statutorily-created federal forum for section 1983 cases,
particularly when there exists an ongoing state administrative proceeding. While the Supreme Court's refusal in N.O.P.S.L v. Council of New
Orleans154 to permit Younger abstention 5 5 may signal that the Court
intends to limit the broad application of Younger to civil proceedings, as
in the case of Colorado River abstention, the temptation for lower courts
to go their own way in refining and applying the various abstention tests
will likely prove too strong. Moreover, Justice Scalia's opinion in
N.O.P.S.L leaves the door open for Younger abstention whenever the
state proceeding is "judicial in nature." '5 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Blackmun, in concurrence, seem to invite further expansion.1 57
B. The PracticalEffects of Abstention
In its empirical examination of post-Younger abstention cases that
have reached the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Committee focused on whether abstention had the practical effect of frustrating
or unduly delaying the adjudication of federal claims. The abstention
doctrines rest on the presumption that relegating a litigant to a state
court proceeding, in which an initial decision on federal claims is made,
will not entail any unacceptable injury to federally protected interests.1 58
This strong presumption may be dispelled, however, if the very process
151. 842 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988).
152. See id. at 40.
153. See id.
154. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
155. See id.at 2516-20.
156. Id. at 2521.
157. See id. at 2521 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
158. See, Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention into
Ongoing State Court Proceedings,66 N.C.L. Rev. 49, 51 (1987).
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of abstention-including satellite litigation in the appropriate forumfrustrates or unduly delays -the adjudication of federal claims. The results of the Committee's inquiry suggests that there have been varied impacts with respect to three broad and overlapping categories of cases:
cases in which federal claims were asserted in the context of a civil dispute of a classwide or institutional nature; cases in which federal claims
were brought in the context of criminal or disciplinary proceedings; and
cases in which federal claims were brought to gain a tactical advantage in
pending state court proceedings. Cases which illustrate each of these categories are discussed below.
1. Civil Disputes of a Classwide or Institutional Nature
The first category of cases presents the greatest potential for abstention
to frustrate or delay federal actions. The eleven years of litigation in
Pineman v. Oechslin15 9 illustrates the type of damaging results which abstention doctrines may produce. In 1977, state employees filed a federal
action challenging the constitutionality of state statutory amendments
which "rais[ed] the retirement eligibility ages for female [state] employees so that they equaled the ages required for male employees, [and
In 1980, the district
which] reduced benefits for female employees."'"
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the statutory amendments impaired the state's contractual obligations,6 1 in violation of the contract clause of the United States Constitution.1
In 1981, the Second Circuit, relying on Pullman and Burford, vacated
and remanded that judgment, holding that abstention was appropriate to
afford state courts the opportunity to adjudicate a state law aspect of the
plaintiffs' claim. 6 ' The Second Circuit, however, directed the district
court to retain jurisdiction pending the state courts' resolution of the
state law question.1 63 Accordingly, from 1981 to 1985, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully litigated the state law issue in the Connecticut trial and appellate courts." 6 In 1985, the plaintiffs returned to the federal courts,
65
which eventually dismissed their constitutional claims on the merits.'
The prolonged and serpentine history of the Pineman case suggests
that-particularly in cases involving federal claims asserted in a civil dispute of a classwide or institutional nature-the federal courts should
carefully weigh the risks of impeding and unduly delaying the adjudication of federal claims against the objectives which might be achieved by
abstention.
159. 637 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987).
160. Id. at 603.
161. See Pineman v. Oechslin, 494 F. Supp. 525 (D. Conn. 1980), vacated, 637 F.2d
601 (2d Cir. 1981).
162. See Pineman, 637 F.2d at 605-06.
163. See id. at 606 n.9.
164. See Pineman v. Oechslin, 195 Conn. 405, 488 A.2d 803 (1985).
165. See Pineman v. Fallon, 662 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Conn. 1987), aff'd, 842 F.2d 598
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 72 (1988).
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Mendez v. Heller,1 66 although decided on justiciability grounds rather
than a specific abstention doctrine, further illustrates the potential for
delay in federal claim adjudication which may be imposed by nonintervention doctrines. In Mendez, the plaintiff sought a divorce, but did not
satisfy New York's two-year residency requirement. 6 7 Proceeding on
the assumption that a divorce complaint would be rejected on jurisdictional grounds by the state courts, the plaintiff filed a civil rights suit in
the Eastern District of New York in 1987, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of
the New York residency requirement. A three-judge federal court dismissed the suit for want of a justiciable controversy.1 68 Appeal was
taken to the United States Supreme Court, which directed that a timely
appeal be taken to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 16 9 The Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in 1976, determining that
none of the state-official defendants were properly named and that the
plaintiff was required to present her claim initially to the New York
0
Courts. 17

Approximately two years passed between the commencement of the
federal litigation in Mendez and the Second Circuit decision requiring
that the plaintiff assert her claims in the state forum. In the interim, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Iowa durational residency statute,1 71 thus persuading the plaintiff in Mendez not
to pursue a federal constitutional challenge to the New York statute in
the state forum. Mendez, like Pineman, suggests that, particularly in the
context of class or institutional litigation, the federal courts should consider carefully the risk that nonintervention doctrines may frustrate or
unduly delay the adjudication of federal claims.
On the other hand, there may be instances where federal court intervention, at least in the presence of ongoing state court proceedings, may
delay adjudication of federal claims in state court. For example, Cannady v. Valentin, 1 72 which involved claims that homeless families with
children had been denied lawful emergency housing by state and city
officials in violation of federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions, was first presented to the federal courts in a very different posture from those cases mentioned above. Unlike Pineman and Mendez, in
Cannady the federal courts confronted a situation in which there was a
pending state litigation brought on behalf of a proposed class similar to
the proposed federal court class; 173 the pending state court litigation in166. 530 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976).
167. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 230(5) (MeKinney Supp. 1986).
168. See Mendez v. Heller, 380 F. Supp. 985, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d
457 (2d Cir. 1976).
169. See Mendez v. Heller, 420 U.S. 916 (1975).
170. See Mendez, 530 F.2d at 459-61.
171. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
172. 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985).
173. See McCain v. Koch, 127 Misc.2d 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
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volved many of the same claims subsequently raised in the federal action;
certain local governmental officials were defendants in both actions; and
the state court had granted interim equitable relief to the
plaintiffs three
174
months before the commencement of federal litigation.
In Cannady, the Second Circuit, relying on Colorado River and Burford, affirmed the district court's decision staying federal litigation pending the resolution of the prior, parallel state court action. 175 The Second
Circuit voiced the concern that "intervention by a federal court . . .
might only delay a prompt resolution of this dispute."' 176 The litigation
of abstention questions in Cannady has had no apparent dilatory effect
on the adjudication of federal claims. While the state court action is still
pending,
the preliminary injunctive relief granted therein remains in
77
effect. 1
Pineman and Mendez stand in stark contrast to Cannady and indicate
that, in general, abstention serves to frustrate and unduly delay resolution of federal claims in class action suits. Moreover, discussions with
counsel for plaintiffs in institutional and classwide litigation confirmed
the perception that abstention is a significant bar to the timely and effective adjudication of federal claims. Counsel noted two principal ways in
which they view state courts as potentially ineffective for the litigation of
federal claims.
First, some lawyers perceive state courts as being hostile to class actions, generally ill-equipped to manage them and unfamiliar with their
operation. In particular, state court class actions against government
agencies are considered inappropriate. Counsel reported that state
courts consider a single-plaintiff declaratory judgment action sufficient
because courts presume that an agency will comply with the court's decision on a classwide basis. Attorneys pointed out to the Committee that
difficulties arise when the agency does not comply with the singular
judgement. In that event, no persons similarly situated receive the benefits of a state plaintiff's favorable determination. Instead, aggrieved parties must bring separate and costly additional suits-a particular
hardship in cases involving small amounts of money.
Attorneys consider New York state courts particularly inadequate to
handle class actions because the New York state class action rules do not
embrace the three different types of class actions provided for under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). 17 Under the federal rules, it is much
174. See id. at 23-24, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
175. See Cannady, 768 F.2d at 503.
176. Id.
177. See McCain v. Koch, 136 A.D.2d 473, 523 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1st Dep't 1988).
178. Similar to Rule 23, New York C.P.L.R. section 901 requires numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L & R § 901
(McKinney Supp. 1989). New York C.P.L.R. section 901 also requires that the class
action in question be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id. Last, section 902, among other things, imposes a manageability requirement. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L & R § 902 (McKinney Supp. 1989). These
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easier to persuade a court to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for injunctive relief than it is to obtain certification of a damages class action
under Rule 23(b)(3). One reason for this is that Rule 23(b)(3) adds additional requirements. 7 9 Since New York requires that any class action
meet rigorous requirements similar to those imposed by Federal Rule
23(b)(3), it follows that it will be very difficult to persuade state court
judges to certify class actions in any type of case. 18 0 In institutional litigation, the key forms of relief are declaratory and injunctive relief.'
Accordingly, the inability to obtain class certification in these types of
cases denies federal plaintiffs their federal procedural rights."8 2
The second source of frustration of federal rights reported to the Committee is the prospect of undue delay in the state court system in complex
cases. In a flagrant example, Levy v. Lewis,"8 3 there was a delay of seven
years between the affirmance of dismissal by the Second Circuit on abstention grounds, and the denial of the federal claim by a state courtappointed referee. Plaintiffs in Levy brought a federal class action alleging that the termination of retirement benefits of former employees of an
insurance company by the New York Superintendent of Insurance, acting as liquidator of the company, violated federal and state law.' 8 4 The
Second Circuit, relying on Burford, Younger and ColoradoRiver, ordered
abstention as to the claims for benefits. 8 5 According to counsel those
benefits claims are still unresolved almost eight years later. In the
meantime, three of the five named claimants have died.
2.

Federal Claims Brought During Criminal or Disciplinary
Proceedings

Abstention issues also arise when plaintiffs assert federal claims in the
context of state criminal or disciplinary proceedings. In general, howrequirements are comparable to the additional requirements for certifying a class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the so-called damages class action.
179. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
180. It is clear that when Article 9 of the New York C.P.L.R. was adopted in 1975, the
intent was to liberalize the use of class actions in New York. See J. Weinstein, H. Korn
& A. Miller, New York Civil Practice %901.01, at 9-6 to 9-9 (1989). Studies have shown,
however, that New York state courts continued to interpret Article 9 very restrictively.
See id. at 9-21. On the other hand, some commentators have stated that there were some
positive developments. See id. at 9-21 to 9-24. In any event, there is no doubt that Article 9 contains sufficient discretionary devices for refusing to certify a given case as a class

action.

181. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against allegedly unconstitutional confinement
in state mental facility).
182. The Supreme Court has held that class certification acts as a procedural issue
which exists independent of the substantive merits in class litigation. See United States
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 (1980).

183. 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980).

184. See id. at 962.
185. See id. at 963-67.
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ever, interviews with counsel and a review of reported decisions indicate
that abstention in this type of case does not present as great a risk of
frustration or unacceptable delay in adjudication of federal claims as
does abstention in classwide or institutional civil disputes.
In Davis v. Lansing,Is6 the Second Circuit recently affirmed, on abstention grounds, the dismissal of a state criminal defendant's federal habeas
corpus petition, where the state defendant was on trial in state court.18 7
The Second Circuit rejected the suggestion that "a federal court exert
control over [the defendant's] state trial," and pointed out that "he can
raise any constitutional claims on direct appeal in the state courts if he is
convicted." 18 8
Erdmann v. Stevens 189 is an example of abstention in the context of
disciplinary proceedings. In September, 1971, an attorney brought a federal action to enjoin disciplinary proceedings against him, contending
that the proceedings violated his federal constitutional rights and section
1983.190 After the district court dismissed the action, the Second Circuit,
relying on Younger v. Harris, affirmed on abstention grounds. 19 1 The
Second Circuit rendered its decision in April, 1972, less than seven
months after federal litigation commenced. In subsequent state court litigation, the New York Court of Appeals ultimately dismissed the disciplinary proceedings on non-federal grounds.192
3.

Federal Claims Brought to Gain a Tactical Advantage in Pending
State Court Proceedings

Where federal cases have been brought, at least in part, to gain a tactical advantage in pending state proceedings, abstention does not appear to
present as great a risk of frustration or undue delay in adjudication of
federal claims as does abstention in classwide or institutional civil
193
disputes.
In Powers v. Coe,194 for example, the state criminal trial of a former
state official charged with obstruction ofjustice was scheduled to begin in
March, 1983. One day before his criminal trial was to commence, the
186. 851 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1988).
187. See id. at 78.
188. Id. at 76.
189. 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); see also Anonymous v.
Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.) (state bar disciplinary proceeding), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
190. See Erdmann, 458 F.2d at 1207.
191. See id. at 1210-12.
192. See In re Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973).
193. See, e.g., Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1984) (abstention in challenge to
state criminal proceeding), aff'd sub. nom. Powers v. McGuigan, 769 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.
1985); Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 863 (1975). Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir.) (abstention in challenge to state disciplinary proceeding), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
194. 728 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub. nom. Powers v. McGuigan, 769 F.2d 1205
(2d Cir. 1985).
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plaintiff filed a section 1983 action in federal court against state prosecutors, challenging their conduct of grand jury proceedings leading to the
prosecution and seeking an injunction against his criminal trial.19' The
federal district court, relying on Younger, denied the injunction motion
and the trial proceeded. 196 Three weeks later, the former state official
pleaded guilty to some of the state charges and his section 1983 action
was ultimately dismissed on the merits.
C. Conclusions and Recommendations
In sum, the Committee's examination of the Second Circuit's postYounger abstention cases suggests that the risk that abstention will have
the practical effect of frustrating or unduly delaying the adjudication of
federal claims is greatest in cases involving federal claims arising from
administrative proceedings and asserted in civil disputes of a classwide or
institutional nature. In those cases, the federal courts should be particularly careful to weigh such risks against the objectives which might be
achieved by abstention. Federal courts should also assess whether abstention might actually result in more rather than less litigation, litigation of longer duration or piecemeal litigation.
The Committee on Federal Courts made the following
97
recommendations:1
1. Federal courts should pay greater attention to the Supreme
Court's command that abstention be invoked only under exceptional circumstances, 198 particularly in civil and administrative cases.
2. When there is a need to resolve a novel, unclear issue of state law,
federal courts should use, as an alternative to abstention, state certification procedures' 9 9 to obtain advisory opinions from the states' highest
courts. 2 °

3. In deciding whether to invoke abstention, the district court should
hold a hearing to consider, in addition to the traditional criteria, the following: the anticipated duration of the state court proceeding; whether
any delay seriously prejudices the federal rights involved; the degree of
preclusive effect of the state court determination on the federal claims;
the impact of a state forum on litigants' ability to maintain class litigation where appropriate; the probable familiarity of state courts with the
federal law in question; and other factors which may be present in the
195. See id. at 100.
196. See id. at 98.
197. 122 F.R.D. 89, 106-07 (1988).
198. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818
(1975).
199. See, e.g., N.Y. Rules of Court of Appeals § 500.17 (McKinney 1989); Colo. App.
Rule 21.1 (1984); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:72.1 (West Supp. 1989); Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Rule 3:21 (1966); 11 Va. Code Ann. R. 5:42 (1989).
200. See, e.g., Griffin Hosp. v. Commission on Hosps. & Health Care, 782 F.2d 24, 2526 (2d Cir. 1986) (Connecticut certification procedure should be employed to prevent
undue delay associated with Pullman abstention).

200
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case, bearing on the relative competence of state courts to decide federal
questions and related facts in the first instance.
4. An abstaining federal court should generally stay, rather than dismiss, the federal action in order to insure that the federal courts remain
open and fully accessible to the federal plaintiff.
5. In appropriate cases, the abstaining federal court should consider
granting interim equitable relief to insure the protection of federal rights
while the issues are resolved in the state court proceeding.
III.

SOME THOUGHTS ON MAKING YOUNGER CIVIL

A.

Why ProfessorStravitz is Wrong

Professor Stravitz complains that the "Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained why Younger abstention should be limited to a pending state criminal or civil enforcement proceeding."2 ' He goes on to
state that "the doctrine's theoretical foundation ... support[s] its application in civil as well as criminal litigation."2 "2 The problem with Professor Stravitz' argument is the problem with abstention in general and
Younger abstention in particular. Both Professor Stravitz and the
Supreme Court assume the correctness of the expressed policy and theoretical foundations of Younger abstention without any critical analysis or
apparent concern for the consequences of the doctrine.20 3 This lack of
critical analysis, however, is not warranted given the substantial interests
negatively affected by the abstention doctrines, especially, as the Committee's Report shows, in institutional litigation.
Enough has been written on whether the Court was wrong in looking
to equitable principles to justify Younger.2" Moreover, Professor
Stravitz has correctly noted that the Court itself has largely abandoned
the equity argument in favor of a purely federalism rationale.20 5 Merely
raising federalism, however, poses the risk of major abdications of federal
jurisdiction in the face of plaintiff's right to invoke a federal forum.
Professor Stravitz recites the four federalism bases that Professor Redish has extrapolated from the Supreme Court's Younger cases:
(1) The desire to avoid affronting state judges by questioning their
competence and/or willingness to enforce constitutional rights; (2) the
201. Stravitz, supra note 5, at 999.
202. Id.
203. Professor Stravitz indicates that he sanctions full application of the Younger doctrine to civil proceedings "[w]ithout entering the debate concerning the wisdom of
Younger itself." Id.
204. See, e.g., M. Redish, supra note 75, at 298-302; Soifer & Macgill, supra note 17, at
1178; Wechsler, supra note 17, at 875-88; Whitten, supra note 17, at 678-83.
205. See Stravitz, supra note 5, at 1007-08; see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334
(1977) (predominant underpinnings of Younger are comity and federalism, not involvement in the criminal process).
Last term, however, the Court in N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct.
2506 (1989), suggested that the basis for the federal courts' power to abstain stemmed
from its "discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief." Id. at 2513.
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need to prevent federal judicial interference with the accomplishment
of state substantive legislative goals; (3) the need to preserve the discretion of state executive officers in general and state prosecutors in particular, and (4) the desire to prevent federal20 6interference with the
orderly operation of the state judicial process.
Professor Stravitz agrees with Professor Redish that the second and
third rationales have been undermined and "should be accorded little or
no weight. ' 207 Although he criticizes the first and fourth rationales, Professor Redish asserts that they possess greater legitimacy than the second
or the third rationales.20 s After discussing all four rationales and tracing
the development of Younger abstention outside of the criminal context
through Pennzoil, Professor Stravitz posits a novel justification for'20ab9
stention: Younger "is a judicially-created forum allocation device.
Professor Stravitz is, in a sense, on to something here: abstention has
more to do with a judicial philosophy about the proper role of the federal
courts than it does about true federalism. If Professor Stravitz is correct,
the question then becomes: what power does a federal court have to decide to relegate a case to a state forum?
Professor Stravitz, unfortunately, begs the question. He argues that
the application of Younger to civil litigation in Pennzoil "will not result
in a wholesale abdication of federal authority"2 1 because state interests
rarely are implicated in a private action, thus making Younger abstention
appropriate only in the preliminary injunction stage or enforcement of
judgment stage of the litigation. 21 I Raising the federalism flag again, he
declares: "It would be offensive to federalism for a federal court to intrude into the state judicial process at these stages of litigation."2 2 He
does not explain, however, why it is more intrusive at these points, nor
does he explain why in some cases, even under Younger, it would be
appropriate for the federal court to intervene.21 3 Moreover, Professor
Stravitz ignores that even if Younger abstention is not appropriate, Pullman, ColoradoRiver or perhaps Burford abstention may be and the federal plaintiff may be required to commence a state court action. The
Court is actually deciding as a matter of forum allocation that it would
prefer the state courts to handle the claim.
In the context of the preferred federalism justifications, civil cases of
206. Redish, supra note 75, at 298.
207. Stravitz, supra note 5, at 1008.
208. See Redish, supra note 75, at 298-302.
209. Stravitz, supra note 5, at 1030; see also Werhan, supra note 24, at 450-52 (judicial
doctrines arising from federalism act to allocate cases between federal and state courts).
210. Stravitz, supra note 5, at 1029.
211. See id. These are the stages when a plaintiff could argue that the state court judge
is acting under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a federally secured right,
thereby implicating section 1983.
212. Id. at 1030.
213. Actually, the preliminary injunction stage and the post-enforcement stage may be
the most critical stages of the private litigation, and, generally, may be the only stages in
which there may be state action subject to federal control.
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an institutional nature implicate state competency and willingness to enforce federal rights. Despite the Court's pronouncement in N. O.P.S.L v.
Council of New Orleans,2"' it is only a short step away for the Court to
find that federalism means a desire to avoid federal interference with
state institutional or agency processes. As discussed earlier, the meaning
of "judicial in nature" is unclear.2"' Indeed, the state's interest in
N.O.P.S.L-the rates charged' by a utility-are far greater than Texas'
interest in helping Pennzoil resolve a private dispute.
Additionally, Professor Stravitz places the Supreme Court in the exalted role as the final arbiter of the scope of its own jurisdiction. While
the Court has always played a role, it is axiomatic that Congress has the
final authority for such decisions.21 6
B.

What Does Federalism Really Mean?

The Committee on Federal Court's Report shows that the danger of
abstention is most pronounced in civil cases involving state institutions
and agencies, rather than in cases in which a state court criminal, or
quasi-criminal, defendant files a reactive federal lawsuit. Commentators
who favor abstention generally do so because of the vital principles of
equitable restraint, comity and federalism that are raised in cases involving criminal prosecutions.2 17 When the Younger Court as well as commentators speak of federalism, however, they are not simply referring to
simplistic notions of states' rights.2"' Rather, they are deferring to a
state's interest in enforcing state law and their competence to decide
fairly any federal issues that are raised, at least once a criminal or quasicriminal proceeding is commenced.
Federalism has become a monolithic euphemism for states' rights, but
more properly should be viewed as a continuum. Federalism as a properly applied doctrine would recognize that the greater the state's legitimate interest, the more intrusive and inappropriate will be federal
intervention. Conversely, the greater the federal interest, the greater the
need for federal intervention.21 9
When a state commences a prosecution-assuming no bad faith-the
214. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
215. See id.
216. See Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: FederalCourts and State Power,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1486-87 (1987).
217. See, e.g., Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruningthe Abstention Doctrine, 75 Geo.
L. J. 99, 102-03 (1986) (Colorado River abstention unjustified and "is most urgently in
need of pruning from the abstention tree.").
218. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (disclaiming "blind deference
to 'State's Rights' "); Althouse, supra note 217, at 1488 (discussing Justice Black's articulation of federalism in Younger).
219. Cf.Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal"Decisions: A Study in
Interactive Federalism, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 861, 874-75 (1985) (discussing models of state/
federal relations); Wisdom, Foreward: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1063, 1068-69 (1984) (discussing evolution of "dual federalism" and "cooperative federalism").
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state's valid generic interest in enforcing its laws attaches.22 ° Indeed,2 in
21
some sense, the state defendant has lost the race to the courthouse.
Bowing to judicial economy, together with the state interest in enforcing
its laws, the federal court arguably should stay its hand. The federal
court should abstain, not because the federal issue sought to be raised by
the criminal defendant is unimportant, but rather because an adequate
forum has already been invoked to handle the case. A reactive federal
lawsuit would serve to complicate the state's important generic interest
in enforcing its laws without federal intervention in an ongoing state proceeding and strain judicial resources. Assuming that parity exists between state courts and federal courts in handling criminal matters2 22 and
that there is an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims in state
proceedings, state defendants should be accorded just as speedy relief in
the state courts as in the federal courts. Thus, the plaintiff's interest and
the federal interest in securing immediate protection of federal rights will
not be impaired. In the rare cases in which the state defendant can
demonstrate bad faith or the need for prompt intervention, the Committee's recommendation of allowing interim federal relief is available. On
balance, in this class of cases, state interests in avoiding federal intervention arguably outweigh the need or propriety of federal intervention.
In civil cases of an institutional nature, however, the state's interest is
much weaker. In most cases, there is no pending state judicial proceeding. Rather, the plaintiff brings an original action against state officials
alleging federal law violations along with any pendant state claims.
Although state interests are implicated whenever state policies or actions
are alleged to violate federal law, they are not as pronounced as when a
state acts affirmatively to enforce its laws.2 23
In addition, in the typical case, the federal plaintiff initiates the litigation over the matter in dispute by commencing a federal action. These
cases generally will not be reactive cases.2 24 All that is at stake at the
commencement will be the federal plaintiff's right to invoke the federal
forum to protect federal rights. For the federal court to abstain in this
situation would be "blind deference to State's Rights" 225 unless some
220. See N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2516 (1989).
221. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the Court held that in the absence of
a state criminal proceeding, a federal court could grant declaratory relief. See id. at 475.
222. State judges routinely decide federal constitutional defenses. See Althouse, supra
note 217, at 1490.
223. See Althouse, supra note 217, at 1532-34. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in University Club v. City of New York, 842 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988), and Christ
the King Regional High School v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484

U.S. 830 (1987), however, seems to have ruled that state interests may be as strong in the
civil context as in the criminal context. See supra notes 144-153 and accompanying text.
224. Ironically, Pennzoil was a reactive case in which the federal plaintiffs sought to
enjoin a pending state proceeding. Such rare cases make federal intervention less desire-

able and more problematic because the first and fourth of Professor Redish's rationales
are implicated. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
225. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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state interest can be articulated that outweighs the various federal interests at stake: for example, the plaintiff's interest in a federal forum and
the federal interest in maintaining the supremacy of federal law. Extending Younger abstention to civil cases without identifying specific
state interests which compel federal deference "strains fundamental assumptions" underlying the Younger doctrine.2 26
Although it may be true that there is no widespread disregard for federal rights in state appellate courts, 2 27 it is the plaintiff's right to choose a
federal forum. This right is even more compelling when the federal
plaintiff is not an involuntary state court defendant. It is less compelling
when the party seeking the federal forum is a state defendant in a case
involving the state as plaintiff or prosecutor.2 28
C. Rethinking Abstention Again
Now that courts have abandoned an independent equity justification
for Younger abstention, the policy justifications for each abstention doctrine, including Burford22 9 and Colorado River, can fairly be said to be
based on federalism-specifically, on the notion that it is in the national
interest to let each system, state and federal, do what it does best. Presumably, that means that each forum should adjudicate issues arising out
of its own law, especially in cases which implicate the forum's interests. 230 Because the existence of an important state interest plays a
prominent role in both Pullman2 3' and Younger 232 abstention, and increasingly in Burford analysis, 23 3 there are compelling reasons to unify
the doctrines under a single, easily applicable doctrine. Because no federal interests-such as federal claims-are implicated in most Burford
cases, abstention is less problematic. In Younger and Pullman, however,
federal claims are asserted, and accordingly, courts should be more reluc226. Althouse, supra note 15, at 1052, 1081-82, 1085-86.
227. See Solimine & Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in FederalCourts: An Empirical
Analysis of JudicialParity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213, 252 (1983).
228. In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1
(1983), the Court refused to allow the state court defendant to remove a state action for
the collection of taxes to federal court. See id. at 13-14. One of the claims was for a
declaration that the federal ERISA statute did not preempt state tax laws. See id. at 24.
229. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 829 n.7 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 394 (1988); Cox v. Planning Dist. I Community Health &
Mental Retardation Servs. Bd., 669 F.2d 940, 942-43 (4th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1980).
230. See Althouse, supra note 217, at 1504-05. Now that the Supreme Court has recognized the applicable law to be a factor in ColoradoRiver abstention, see supra note 100
and accompanying text, even that doctrine falls within this framework.
231. See Nassen v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 440 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982).
232. See Althouse, supra note 15, at 1075-78; supra note 77 and accompanying text.
233. See N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2521 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]here is considerable tension between [the majority's] discussion
of the nature of State's interests in the Burford context and its discussion of the State's
interests in the Younger context.").
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tant to abstain. Additionally, the question of adequacy of the state proceeding is a component of each doctrine.23 4
A new approach to abstention, therefore, should unify the existing
doctrines based on those factors which require federal deference to state
courts in certain instances.2 35
1. The Committee's Recommendations
The Committee on Federal Court's recommendations 236 ought to be
seriously considered and incorporated as part of a unified analysis. Federal courts should pay greater attention to the need for exceptional circumstances in order to justify abstention, extending this requirement to
all forms of abstention, not simply Colorado River abstention. This recommendation complements this author's proposal to place the burden of
persuasion on the proponent of abstention.2 37
In addition, federal courts should make greater use of state certification procedures. Indeed, the Supreme Court has encouraged the use of
state certification procedures that provide for advisory opinions. 238 Certification is preferable to abstention for two reasons: it generally takes
less time than abstention 239 and the preclusive effects of the state court
decision are minimized because state courts generally are deciding the
issue as a pure matter of law. 2 ' Next, a hearing to consider the various
factors pertinent to an abstention decision would ensure a careful balanc234. See, e.g., Field, supra note 30, at 1144 (Pullman);Public Service Comm. v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 345 (1951) (Burford); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986) (Younger); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983) (ColoradoRiver).
235. In Pennzoil, the Supreme Court majority noted: "[t]he various types of abstention
are not rigid pigeonholes into which the federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they
reflect a complex set of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system
that contemplates parallel judicial processes." Pennzoil Co v. Texaco Inc. 481 U.S. 1, 11
n.9 (1987). But see N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2513 (1989)
(after quoting the above language in Pennzoil, concluding that "policy considerations
supporting Burford and Younger are sufficiently distinct to justify independent
analyses.").
236. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 243-260 and accompanying text.
238. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Assoc., 108 S. Ct. 636, 643 (1988) (Virginia
Supreme Court should be given first opportunity to interpret a statute prohibiting display
of sexually explicit material to juveniles); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 470
(1987) ("The certification procedure is useful in reducing the substantial burdens of cost
and delay that abstention places on litigants."). Commentators support increased use of
certification as a means of ameliorating the costs of Pullman abstention. See, e.g.,
Werhan, supra note 24, at 472 n.91.
239. The substantial delay in processing plaintiff's federal claim that results from Pullman abstention is well documented. See Moe v. Dinkins, 635 F.2d 1045, 1048 n.8 (2d
Cir. 1980) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982). Certification, in contrast,
acts as a speedier device for resolution of federal claims. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132, 150-51 (1976).
240. The state court ruling is merely an advisory opinion. Because there will be no
binding judgment, the federal court will be free to apply the rule of law to the facts of the
case.
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ing of the federal and state interests, as well as the federal plaintiff's interests. Finally, federal court retention of jurisdiction while state
adjudication proceeds would ensure the availability of federal relief on an
ongoing basis should any unforseen problems arise when abstention is
ordered. 4 1
Federal courts should, in addition, consider several other factors in
such a unified approach.
2.

The Burden of Proof

A federal plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving that subject
matter jurisdiction exists.24 2 In deciding whether to abstain, a federal
court typically puts the burden of proving that the court should retain
jurisdiction on the plaintiff. 43 That approach is incorrect. Assuming a
colorable federal claim," the plaintiff is entitled to invoke the federal
forum and to have the claims asserted heard by an Article III judge.2 45
Accordingly, the burden of proof when deciding abstention issues should
be on the proponent of abstention.
The question of whether to abstain is analytically similar to the question of whether a government official may claim an immunity, which is
treated as an affirmative defense.24 6 When a defense of immunity is
241. See Wells, PreliminaryInjunctionsand Abstention: Some Problems in Federalism,
63 Cornell L. Rev. 65, 82-89 (1977).
242. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612 n.28 (1979);
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1936).
243. One might argue that, especially with respect to Colorado River abstention, the
courts put the burden on the proponent of abstention, citing language in the cases to the
effect that abstention should be ordered only under exceptional circumstances. See supra
note 90 and accompanying text. In Younger cases, however, there can be no doubt that
the courts put the burden on the federal plaintiff to show some exception to the Younger
doctrine. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (burden of proving
inadequacy of state proceeding rests on plaintiff).
244. This includes a federal question, a diversity matter or some other type of federal
jurisdiction.
245. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court ruled that absent a waiver, a party involved in a
federal court proceeding had a right to a hearing before an Article III judge. See id. at
58-59. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 151160 (1982), was unconstitutional because it allowed bankruptcy judges, who did not have
the Article III lifetime tenure and salary protection, to decide matters that otherwise
would be heard by an Article III judge. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-84. The
Court did not say that a state court judge would not be competent to decide a matter of
state law that would arise in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. In fact, it assumed
state court competence. The point of Northern Pipeline, however, is not the competence
of the adjudicator. Rather, the point is that when federal jurisdiction is properly invoked,
the litigants in the action have a right to Article III determination. The Supreme Court
should not use a judicially created doctrine when it interferes with a constitutional right.
Cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (eleventh amendment overrides judicially created doctrine of pendent jurisdiction).
246. The question whether to abstain is discretionary. Thus, the issue differs from that
in Pennhurst, where the result was dictated by the constitutional requirements of the
eleventh amendment. See supra note 9. Accepting the majority's rationale in Pennhurst,
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raised, the Supreme Court has placed the burden of pleading24 7 and
proof2 48 on the proponent of the immunity. The same approach should
be adopted in abstention cases: the party who requests that the federal
court abstain should be required to plead and prove the elements necessary to invoke abstention. It is proper to put the burden on the opponent
of federal jurisdiction because of the presumption that the plaintiff's
choice of forum, indeed his right to the federal forum, should be
honored.
Federalism is not the business of the federal courts. Rather, the
Supreme Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author249
ity,
made clear that Congress should address federalism concerns.25 0
Accordingly, the federal courts should not abstain in the name of federalism unless there is some indication that Congress intended the courts to
show restraint. Therefore, the rebuttable presumption should be that the
courts are to exercise jurisdiction. In some cases, an analysis of the federal jurisdictional statute invoked, federal cause of action pleaded, or
some other federal text may provide the basis for an inference that Congress would prefer that the court abstain. For example, even in the typical Younger case, notwithstanding Mitchum v. Foster,2 ' the federal court
could cite Congress' intent that federal courts not enjoin pending state
court proceedings. Congress intended the scope of the Anti-Injunction
Act to be broad and the Court generally has construed its exceptions
narrowly.2 52 Just as the Court has sanctioned the use of federal common
law when there is some indicia of congressional intent,2 53 the Court
should refuse to intervene when it concludes that Congress would
disapprove.
This presumption against intervention in state proceedings must be
weighed against the contrary presumption that arises when Congress expresses a desire to provide a litigant with a federal right and a federal
forum for enforcing that right. For example, Congress has designed secthe eleventh amendment stood as a complete bar to the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over the state law claims. See id. Even in the Younger situation, the Court can and will
exercise jurisdiction and grant injunctive relief if the plaintiff can show great and immediate irreparable harm will result. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
247. See Toledo v. Gomez, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
248. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).

249. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
250. The Garcia Court recognized that state sovereignty, while central to our federal

structure, is better protected through the procedural safeguards inherent in the federal
political process than by "judicially created limitations on federal power." Garcia, 469

U.S. at 547-52. Instead of restricting the power of Congress to act, the Court recognized
that the best limitations on federal usurpation of power are the "restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action." Id. at 556.
251. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
252. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.
281, 286-87 (1970).
253. See State of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101-04 (1972); Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
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tion 1983 to be an extremely intrusive remedy.25 4 Congress' well-documented intent to provide federal plaintiffs with a hospitable federal
forum, 255 especially in cases involving state institutions or agencies, indicates that the federal court should retain jurisdiction and provide a plaintiff with the full range of statutory remedies, including injunctions
against state administrative processes in institutional cases. To argue
that it is more important to protect the sensibilities of state court judges
misses the mark. What interest do state court judges have in preventing
a federal litigant from selecting the forum of its choice? Should a New
York state court judge be offended if a litigant chooses a New Jersey state
court?
Similarly, the adequacy of an alternative forum test, which places the
burden of persuasion on the party opposing abstention, 5 6 is misplaced.
Moreover, even if the state forum is adequate, adequacy should be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for abstention. Indeed, state court
judges should be more offended by the mere inquiry into whether a state
court can adequately protect the federal plaintiff's interests. The plaintiff's right to choose the forum is certainly a less-charged consideration
in determining the adequacy of the forum. The question the Court has
been unable to answer is why the existence of an adequate but alternative
forum should be used to disrupt the plaintiff's choice.
The Court's decision in N.O.P.S.L v. Council of New Orleans2 57 provides some comfort in cases involving state institutions. 258 Nonetheless,
lower courts have abstained in institutional cases 259 and the melding of
Younger and Pullman abstention holds the prospect of further erosion,
despite Justice Scalia's pronouncement. 2" Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion seem to leave the door
ajar for further expansion of abstention in the civil context.2 61
3. The Choice of Law
It is interesting that the Supreme Court and commentators seem more
254. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972).
255. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-71 (1961).
256. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
257. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
258. See id. at 2516-20.
259. See supra notes 159-186 and accompanying text.
260. Indeed, perhaps the result in N.O.P.S.L was foreordained. The issue was federal
preemption in an area involving nuclear power. The Court has been determined to reach
the merits in comparable cases. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), the Court found standing on a rather attenuated causation theory, see id. at 72-81, then upheld the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982), which provided nuclear suppliers with limited liability. See
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 82.
Justice Scalia, not known for his love of expanded federal judicial power, likely refused
to abstain in N.O.P.S.I. for reasons similar to why he decided a federal common law
government contractor defense could be applied in a tort case. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 U.S. 2510, 2513 (1988).
261. See N.O.P.S.L, 109 S. Ct. at 2521.
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willing to defer to state interests in cases involving federal rights and
claims than in ordinary diversity cases. Somehow "federalism" justifies
abdication of federal jurisdiction in federal question cases, but not in diversity cases under Colorado River. Arguably, the Supreme Court has it
backwards by making it easier to abstain in cases involving federal rights
than in cases involving only state law issues. A rational analysis would
be tipped in the other direction. In Moses H. Cone, the Court suggests
that abstention turn on the law to be applied; this notion should be applied in all cases.
As a general rule, if federal law applies, the federal court should retain
jurisdiction over the case. If state law applies and there is a pending state
proceeding raising the same claims, abstention should be ordered. Even
if abstention is a forum allocation device, state interests should not be the
catalyst for abstention. Rather, the federal interest in complete, speedy
vindication of federal rights should motivate courts to retain
jurisdiction.2 62
4.

The Presence of a Pending State Action

When there is a pending state action, there is less need for federal intervention. In the Colorado River scenario, unless the choice of law factor mitigates in favor of retaining federal jurisdiction, the federal court
should generally defer to the pending state proceeding. This vindicates
the principles of parity and saves judicial resources. Moreover, unless
there are federal claims or defenses in issue, the only interest is the plaintiff's desire to litigate in the federal forum. This interest is suspect in
cases in which the federal plaintiff is also the state plaintiff. Even when
the federal plaintiff is the state court civil defendant, recognizing federal
jurisdiction may simply create races to the courthouse.
In the typical Younger scenario, as has been demonstrated, the state
interest in prosecuting the pending state criminal action outweighs the
federal interest. Moreover, as the Committee Report demonstrates, the
risk of prejudice in those cases is minimized.2 6 3
If there is no pending state proceeding, the federal court should not
abstain. In some Pullman cases, the court may use state certification
procedures. In other cases, the federal court should not require duplicative state litigation in the hope that the federal constitutional or statutory
issue will disappear. The federal court could just as easily decide the case
on the state issue;2"4 federal courts apply state law routinely in diversity
cases. There is no prejudice to state interests because the federal rule of
law announced on the question of state law is not binding on the state
courts.
262.
263.
264.
U.S.C.

See Althouse, supra note 15, at 1084-86.
See supra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
Federal courts routinely apply state law pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act, 28
§ 1652 (1982), and Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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The Merits of the Federal Issue

In addition, the merits of the case should be weighed in the decision
whether to keep a case in federal court."' 5 Thus, rather than invoke principles of comity or federalism in deciding whether to abstain, courts
should consider the relative importance of the federal and state interests
raised.2 6 6 One way of measuring the importance of the federal interest is
the strength of the plaintiff's case. Accordingly, the likelihood of success
of the federal claims should tip the balance in favor of retaining
jurisdiction.
Some commentators have assumed that abstention is acceptable because there is a right to appeal adverse state court decisions on federal
issues to the United States Supreme Court. This right, always less than
absolute, is now almost gone. Supreme Court review is now entirely discretionary. z67 As a result, it is unlikely that an erroneous state court
decision on a federal issue will be reviewed. This fact alone requires the
federal courts to look at the merits of the federal issue and also justifies
reversing the de facto2presumption
in favor of abstention in cases involv6
ing federal law issues. 1
6.

The Pennhurst Problem and Institutional Litigation

In PennhurstState School and Hospital v. United States,269 a case involving both federal constitutional and statutory rights, as well as state
law claims, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment barred
federal jurisdiction over pendant state claims against state officials. The
Supreme Court recognized that application of the eleventh amendment
to the pendent state claims may result in the federal claims being litigated
in state courts, or in the bifurcation of claims with attendant preclusion
problems. The Court, however, was not troubled for two reasons. First,
many instances exist in which, under the abstention doctrines, an issue is
split off and referred to state court.2 7 0 Second, "considerations of policy
cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the fed265. But see N.O.P.S.I. v. Council of New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2516 (1989) (rejecting suggestion that Court should take a "quick look" at the merits when deciding
whether to abstain).
266. See Althouse, supra note 15, at 1083-90.
267. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (West Supp. 1989). The 1988 amendment to section 1254
eliminated the non-discretionary "appeal" procedure which required the Court, in certain
instances, to hear cases regardless of their national importance. See id.
268. Cf.Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Forward ConstitutionalLimitations
on Congress'Authority to Delegatethe Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
17, 40-41 (1981) (suggesting that state courts would be less vigilant if Congress withdrew
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction of state court judgments).
Indeed, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), Justice O'Connor rejected an approach to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state court criminal convictions that
would leave state courts as the final arbiters of federal constitutional law. See Althouse,
supra note 217, at 1497.
269. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
270. See id. at 122.
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eral judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State. That a litigant's choice
of forum is reduced 'has long been understood to be a part of the tension
inherent in our system of federalism.' "271
In N.O.P.S.1 v. Councilof New Orleans,"'z Justice Scalia's opinion for
the Court on the Younger argument shows why only a minimal state
interest is sufficient to justify abstention. The Court does not look to the
degree of the state's interest in a particular case. "Rather, what we look
to is the importance of the generic proceedings to the state." '7 3 It is
easier for a state to demonstrate its interest in the smooth functioning of
a particular institution or process, than to demonstrate its interest in a
particular case. Thus, although the Court in N.O.P.S.L declined to apply
Younger abstention in what is characterized as a legislative context, the
climate is ripe for further erosion into the administrative arena. It is in
the Pennhurst scenario that this erosion would have the gravest consequences. Institutional litigation implicates the state's interest in the
smooth functioning of its institutions.
As the Committee report indicated, abstention causes the greatest loss
of federal rights in cases involving institutional litigation. 7 4 After Pennhurst, if the federal court plaintiff wants to litigate state claims, a state
proceeding must be commenced. This raises the specter and the likelihood of Colorado River abstention. Even if the federal plaintiff declines
to commence a state proceeding to protect its state claims, further expansion of the abstention doctrines may lead the federal court to require the
federal plaintiffs to commence a state court action, as Burford or Pullman abstention permit. z75 In either case, if the state court comes to judgment first, the federal plaintiff, as a practical matter, may be precluded
from pursuing the federal claims.2 76
Of course, the federal plaintiff could forfeit its right to a federal forum
entirely, assuming the state court has concurrent jurisdiction over the
federal claims, by bringing all claims in the state forum. Surely, that is
not what the framers of the Constitution, the fourteenth amendment and
various federal statutes had in mind when the federal courts were given
their jurisdiction and powers. Pennzoil's endorsement of Younger abstention in the civil context cannot be accepted without more serious regard
for the potentially grave consequences and effects on federal rights.
CONCLUSION

Abstention has been extended too far and results in federal judicial
abdication in too many cases. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to ar271. Id. at 123 (quoting Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
272. 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).
273. Id. at 2517.
274. See supra notes 159-186 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 24, 53-54 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
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gue that abstention should be abolished. Indeed, in some cases, federalism and judicial economy arguments in favor of abstention have merit.
Unfortunately, the hodgepodge of doctrines has led to a blurring of their
meanings as well as analytic confusion. Accordingly, abstention analysis
should be unified and applied carefully on a case-by-case basis.
It is evident that the Supreme Court and many commentators have
lost sight of a few basic facts. First, the abstention doctrines largely ignore the plaintiff's right to choose the federal court system, as well as the
right to a hearing before an Article III judge that attaches once the federal system is invoked. No one has satisfactorily explained how a judgemade doctrine can legitimately oust a litigant from a constitutionally
guaranteed forum. Second, although abstention is treated as a procedural device, its application has overwhelming substantive impact.
As a practical matter, the Supreme Court has come very close to merging the tests for its various abstention doctrines. Because the theoretical
foundation for each of the doctrines varies from totally to nearly suspect,
no purpose is served by maintaining the pretense that there are different
doctrines. The Court should recognize that the similarities so outweigh
the differences that one test for abstention should be adopted that insures
that litigants' federal rights will not be ignored.
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MAKING YOUNGER CIVIL
APPENDIX A

ABSTENTION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Name
2. Address
3. Telephone
4. Name of case
5. Court/venue
6. Index No.
7. Date of Filing
8. Case timetable
(Note any special circumstances affecting case timetable, e.g. interlocutory appeals, stays, etc.)
a. "State" proceeding commenced
b. Federal proceeding commenced
c. Abstention sought
d. Application submitted/argued
e. Abstention ruled upon
f. Appeal filed
g. Appeal determined
h. Termination of "state" proceeding
i. Determination of "federal" rights
9. Nature of federal rights sought to be vindicated, if any
10. Statute(s) sued under
11. Factual circumstances
12. Relief sought
13. Nature of related "state" proceeding
14. Procedurally, how was abstention raised (affirmative defense, motion, sua sponte, etc.)
15. During what phase of proceedings (pre-answer, some discovery,
summary judgment, etc.)
16. District court determination
17. Appellate court determination
18. Effect of determination on plaintiff's federal claims
a. Generally
b. Were federal claims asserted in the state proceeding
c. If yes, what was the outcome
d. If federal claims were discontinued after abstention, what were
the reasons for discontinuance
e. Were any issues of claimed deprivation of rights determined by
any court or tribunal
f. Were federal claims dismissed or upheld on substantive grounds.
If so, give details
19. How much attorney's time was devoted to litigation of abstention
issues
20. What percentage of the litigation was devoted to litigation of abstention issues
21. What was the impact on plaintiff of applications for abstention
22. Was case settled prior to final determination
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23. If yes, what impact did abstention have on settlement position
24. Prospective impact of abstention
A. The potential effect of abstention as a significant factor in determining where to initiate litigation concerning federal rights:
(a) almost always; (b) very frequently; (c) frequently; (d) rarely; (e)
almost never
B. In the same context, abstention as a significant factor in determining
where to assert federal rights in actions brought by an opposing
litigant:
(a) almost always; (b) very frequently; (c) frequently; (d) rarely; (e)
almost never
C. In the course of federal litigation brought by your office, abstention
is raised and determined:
(a) almost always; (b) very frequently; (c) frequently; (d) rarely; (e)
almost never
D. Abstention is most likely to be raised and determined:
(a) in the pleadings; (b) upon motion to dismiss; (c) upon a motion
for summary judgment; (d) at hearing stage; (e) sua sponte
E. In context of other doctrines, when abstention is raised, it becomes
the primary determinant of whether the litigation continues in federal
court:
(a) almost always; (b) very frequently; (c) frequently; (d) rarely; (e)
almost never
F. By the time abstention was determined in an action, discovery was
usually:
(a) almost completed; (b) approximately half finished; (c) partially
completed; (d) just begun; (e) not begun at all
G. When the abstention issue has been raised, it is decided in favor of
your litigant
(a) almost always; (b) very frequently; (c) frequently; (d) rarely; (e)
almost never
H. Overall, in context of other decisions, the impact of abstention is:
(a) preeminent; (b) a major factor; (c) of about equal importance; (d)
less important than others; (e) of minimal importance
I. In the same context, abstention as a deterrent to litigation in the
federal courts is:
(a) preeminent; (b) a major factor; (c) of about equal importance; (d)
less important than others; (e) of minimal importance
J. In approximately how many cases undertaken by your office has
abstention had more than minimal impact, either in choice of forum of
the conduct or litigation
Overall comments

